PERFORMANCE ROYALTIES AND COPYRIGHT:
A QUESTION OF "SOUND" POLICY
The American entertainment industry's phenomenal growth since
World War I has been accompanied by continuing attempts, both
judicial and legislative, to deal with the often complicated legal problems surrounding operation of this seven-billion-dollar-a-year business.' Most of the effort necessarily has been devoted to identifying,
and providing protection for, the various forms of intellectual property which make up our literature, theater and music. 2 Prior to
January 1, 1978, the effective date of the new federal copyright law, a
uniform body of "entertainment law" failed to develop, largely because of inconsistencies among state copyright enactments, 3 and the
I See U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-

STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1972, tables no. 331, 800 & 818 (93d annual ed.) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES]. The sound recording
industry alone reported sales of $1.7 billion in 1970. S. SHEMEL & M. KASILOVSKY,

THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC xvii (rev. ed. 1971). Radio and television stations had revenues that year of $1.1 billion and $2.8 billion, respectively, while the major film
studios grossed $1.5 billion. B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC WORKS 521 (2d ed. 1974). See generally STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, tables no. 331, 800; $2 Billion Worth of

Noise, FORBES, July 15, 1968, at 22; Pop Records: Moguls, Money & Monsters, TIME,
Feb. 12, 1973, at 60-61.
2 For a review of legal developments since adoption of the prior federal copyright
act in 1909 which are within the scope of this Comment, see notes 54-124 infra and
accompanying text.
For a review of relevant legal history prior to 1909, see Ringer, Two Hundred Years
of American Copyright Law, in Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 117 (American Bar Center (1977) (paper

delivered at ABA Annual Meeting at Atlanta, Ga., Aug. 9, 1976); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BULL. No. 3, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES
SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT (Gov't Printing Office 1973).

3 The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2572, effective
Jan. 1, 1978, resolves the problem of conflict among state laws by providing for federal
preemption in the copyright field. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West Cum. Supp. 1977). Both state
statutes and the common law continue to have effect on intellectual property matters
only with respect to certain narrow situations not within the new act's purview. Id. §§
301(b), (c). These areas, remaining outside the scope of federal control, are:
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright; (2)
causes of action arising under State law before the effective date of the statute;
and (3) violations of rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
under copyright.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976).
Prior to the revision bill's passage, however, there was little or no consistency as to
the types of protection each state would afford, or as to the number of states offering the

678

19781

COMMENT

problems which had arisen as a result of the unprecedented advances
made by this country's electronic media.4 Statutes and decisions designed to protect the interest of a composer, for example, at a time
when "public performance" meant no more than delivery before a
concert hall audience, simply did not contemplate the potential legal
issues raised when it became possible to nationally broadcast a work
over television sets from which the performance could, in turn, be
privately recorded on home video-tape units. 5 The inadequacy of
same type of protection. Thus, irs 1974, some 25 states statutorily prohibited record or
tape piracy, while only three had enacted laws dealing with forfeiture of common law
performance rights in sound recordings. See Bard & Kurlantzick, A Public Performance
Right in Recordings: How to Alter the Copyright System Without Improving It, 43
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 155 n.9, 156 & n.l (1974).
The confusion of the state copyright law system has been noted by a number of
commentators. See Waxman, Performance Rights in Sound Recording, 52 TEX. L. REV.
42, 43 & n.4 (1974); Comment, The Sound Recording Act of 1971: An End To Piracy On
The High ©'s?,40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 964, 969 (1972); Note, "Copyright" Protection
For Uncopyrightables: The Common-Law Doctrines, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 730
(1960); 56 COLUM. L. REV. 126, 128-30 (1956).
4 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976); Address by Hon. Barbara
Ringer, Register of Copyrights, before The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (Jan. 19, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Ringer Address]; see Ringer, The Universal
Copyright Convention and its Future, in THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976: DEALING WITH
THE NEW REALITIES 339, 346 (1977); Lang, Performance arid the Right of the Performing Artist, 21 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SyMp. 70, 75 (1974); Righting Copyright, TIME,
Nov. 1, 1976, at 92, col. 1.
For a brief examination of how federal copyright law had been revised up to 1971
to accommodate emerging forms of artistic expression, see Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1973). The law was continually expanded to treat problems surrounding legal protection of photographs, motion pictures and sound recordings. Id.
Perhaps the two most prominent and troublesome technological developments with
which intellectual property law has had to deal over recent years, however, have been
cable television and photoduplication systems. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d
1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). See generally B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, srupra note 1, at 526-36 (2d
ed. 1974); Crossland, The Rise arid Fall of Fair Use: The Protection of Literary Materials Against Copyright Infringement bit New and Developing 1ledia, 20 S.C. L. REV.
153 (1968); Ringer, Recent Cable Television Developmernts in the United States Involvirg Copyright, 3 PERFORMING ARTS REV. 581 (1972). The new act squarely addresses
both areas at length, essentially providing that copyrighted material may be transmitted
over cable television or photoduplicated, but only under controlled circumstances. 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 107, 108, 111(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 65-79, 88-101 (1976).
5Questions as to whether certain uses of a privately-owned video-tape machine are
legally permissible, an area the new act fails to deal with at all, are presently the subject
of a much-publicized lawsuit. Universal Studios v. Sony Corp. No. 76-3520 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Nov. 19, 1976); see What New Copyright Law Does Not Cover, 177 N.Y.L.J. 24
(Jan. 4, 1977); Monuzmerital Legal Battle Shaping Up in Bid to Bar Color TV Recorders,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1977, at D1; The Great Time-Shift Machine Experiment, T.V.
GUIDE, Apr. 9-15, 1977, at 4-8; A Right to Replay?, TIME, Apr. 11, 1977, at 64, cols.
1 & 2.
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existing law in relation to this and similar kinds of issues led to repeated appeals over the last two decades for general revision of the
nation's staple intellectual property law, the federal Copyright Act of
1909.6
Responding to the call for reform, Congress approved "a longawaited and much-amended copyright revision bill"7 on September
30, 1976. The bill was signed into public law on October 19 of that
year by President Gerald R. Ford and has since been the focus of
considerable attention by both legal commentators and the popular

press. 8
Little note has subsequently been given, however, to the particular, controversial provision which would have established a performance royalty right in sound recordings, i.e., would have statutorily mandated compensation for those recording artists whose musical
performances are commercially broadcast to the public. 9 Steadfastly
6Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 1, 35 Stat. 1075. For a discussion of the 1909 Act, and the
reform effort which culminated in passage of the revision bill, see notes 41-53 and
94-124 infra and accompanying text.
7 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 298, Oct. 7, 1976, at A-1.
8

See, e.g., COPYRIGHT REVISION ACT OF 1976 (CCH 1976); THE COPYRIGHT ACT
OF 1976: DEALING WITH THE NEW REALITIES (1977) (bound collection of papers deliv-

ered before conference on the new act, Feb. 24-25, 1977, New York, N.Y.); CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1977 (PLI 1977); Copyright Symposium: Parts I,
II, 22 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 193-292, 471-678 (1976-1977); Righting Copyright, TIME, Nov.
1, 1976, at 92; Finkelstein, New Copyright Impact on Music, Variety, Jan. 5, 1977, at
127; Hersey, Authors League: Weary Warrior, But Grateful, Variety, Jan. 5, 1977,
36, 80.
9
Performance Royalty: Hearings on S. 1111 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyright of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-4 (1975) (statement of Sen. Hugh Scott) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1111].
Essentially, all users of sound recordings (meaning radio stations in particular) would
have been required to pay an annual flat fee, based on their gross advertising revenues.
S. 1111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 33 (1975), reprinted in Hearings on S. 1111, supra, at
3-4. Proponents of the royalty program contemplated the establishment of an independent organization to compute and distribute royalty payments, although such an organization was not expressly provided for by statute. See id.; Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before the Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, part 2, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 506-07, 509 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 597]. Royalty payments would have been made to all persons
who perform on such recordings (performers) as well as to those holding copyright title
to the recording itself (effectively, the record companies). S. 1111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 33(c)(d) (1975), reprinted in Hearings on S. 1111, supra, at 4. Payments to the individual performers would have been based on how much airplay the record received and
would have accrued at a rate of two and three-quarter cents per broadcast, or one-half
cent per minute of playing time, whichever amounted to a greater sum. See note 154
infra. See also Bard & Kurlantzick, supra note 3, at 170-72; Brennan, Legislative History and Chapter 1 of S. 22, 22 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 193, 205 (1976), PAT., T.M. & COpyRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 293, Sept. 2, 1976, at A-5; id., No. 238, July 31, 1975, at A-8 to -11.
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opposed by influential groups within the broadcasting trade, 10 the
clause was deleted from the revision bill's final version when it became apparent that successful passage of the entire act would have
been threatened by continued debate over the performance royalty
issue., However, the provision enjoyed enough support, both in and
out of the political sphere, 1 2 so that it could not be scrapped entirely.
Rather, the performance royalty question was set aside for further
13
review by the Register of Copyrights.
The objective of this Comment is to examine those authorities
which serve as precedent for congressional recognition of a performance royalty, to analyze the major arguments for and against such
recognition, and ultimately to demonstrate that the royalty is warranted both in law and in fact. Although primary consideration shall
10 Among those opposing the performance royalty were: The National Association of
Broadcasters; Music Operators of America, Inc.; American Broadcasting Companies,
Inc.; and the National Broadcasting Company, Inc. Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at
70-76, 80-81, 89-93. Essentially, the opposition was comprised of those organizations
which would have had to pay the royalty fees. See id. at 3, 10-11.
11 Ringer Address, supra note 4 (the performance royalty issue became a "problem"
upon which an "accommodation" could not be reached). For a brief discussion of the
royalty proposal insofar as it was recognized as a threat to passage of the revision bill,
see note 123 infra. See also 120 CONG. REC. 30,399-30,408, 30,478-90 (1974); Brennan,
supra note 9; Ringer, Current Developments In The Law of Copyright, in THE
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976: DEALING WITH THE NEW REALITIES 65, 67 (1977); PAT.,
T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 293, Sept. 2, 1976, at A-5.
12 Among those favoring adoption of the performance royalty provision were: The
American Federation of Television & Radio Artists, AFL-CIO; the Recording Industry
Association of America; the American Federation of Musicians, AFL-CIO; and the Actors Equity Association. Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 18-25; PAT., T.M. &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 238, July 31, 1975, at A-8.
Although most of these organizations are comprised of persons who would be eligible to receive performance royalty benefits, the program also received support from
some who would not be affected directly by its implementation, i.e., Nancy Hanks,
former chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts, and Hon. Barbara A. Ringer,
Register of Copyrights. Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 4-17.
13 The new statute, 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1977), reads in pertinent
part:
On January 3, 1978, the Register of Copyrights, after consulting with representatives of owners of copyrighted materials, representatives of the broadcasting, recording, motion picture, entertainment industries, and arts organizations,
representatives of organized labor and performers of copyrighted materials,
shall submit to the Congress a report setting forth recommendations as to whether this section should be amended to provide for performers and copyright
owners of copyrighted material any performance rights in such material. The
report should describe the status of such rights in foreign countries, the views
of major interested parties, and specific legislative or other recommendations, if
any.
See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106-07 (1976); Ringer, Current Developments, supra note 11, at 67.
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be given to the status of American law, analogous provisions in the
statutes of foreign countries will also be discussed to illustrate feasible
administration of a performance royalty program.
Common Law Copyright
The oldest "and perhaps . . .most basic form of. . .protection"
15
for intellectual property1 4 . remains the recognition of an author's
proprietary interest in a creation before it has been released to the
public, i.e., his common law copyright. The property interest contemplated by the common law arises not only by virtue of the author's natural right to control "the product of his labour,"1 but also
from the fact that the product may have commercial value when released to the populace. If the product's real economic value is based
on dissemination of it to the buying public, then the author's property right is valuable only insofar as it involves control over such dissemination. 1 7 Under the common law, therefore, each artist may
exercise absolute control over initial publication of his work, and may
actually forbid such publication altogether. 18 The only clear requisite
for eligibility under the common law system of protection is that the
work must evidence some element of originality, i.e., must show
14Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 3, at 702 (1960).
15The term "author" as used in this Comment will apply in the generic sense of a
person who creates any form of copyrightable material. It is well-settled in copyright
law that the designation should be expansively understood. See, e.g., Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S.
53, 56-59 (1884).
16Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834).
17 See id.
18See M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT, §§ 46-49, at 183-95 (rev. ed. 1972). The nature of
such pre-publication control was at issue in the case of Estate of Hemingway v. Random
House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968). In that case, the
widow of Ernest Hemingway and his estate brought suit against Random House publishers and A. E. Hotchner, who were, respectively, publisher and author of a biography
entitled Papa Hemingway. Id. at 344-45, 244 N.E.2d at 252-53, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75.
It was contended that publication of this book violated Hemingway's common law
copyright in the substance of conversations upon which Hotchner drew at length to
complete the manuscript, including "anecdote[s], reminiscence[s], literary opinion and
revealing comment about actual persons on whom some of Hemingway's fictional
characters were based." Id. at 344, 244 N.E.2d at 253, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 775. Acknowledging that common law copyright empowered each author "to prevent [a first] publication
entirely," and that authority existed for extending this power to " 'intangible' " creations
such as speech, the court nevertheless denied plaintiffs relief on the grounds that (1)
Hemingway's casual conversation was not a "creation" such as is necessary to invoke
the common law privilege, and (2) the writer had approved similar use of his spoken
dialogue on previous occasions, implying that no common law right was reserved in the
case of Papa Hemingway. Id. at 346-47, 244 N.E.2d at 254-56, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 776-79;
see Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135, 89 N.E.2d 863 (1949).
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"some degree of intellectual creativity."' 9 In addition, it is not necessary that the entity created be in physical form. An intangible creation, such as a distinctive style of performance, would be covered
under the common law but not under the new statute, which requires physical embodiment of its subject matter. 20 Thus, it has been
said that fixation in a tangible medium is, in fact, "the dividing line
21
between common law and statutory protection."
Of potentially infinite duration, the artist's common law copyright is not extinguished until it is waived, or until the work itself is
"published," that is, made generally available to the public in such
a
manner as to justify the belief that the creator no longer intends to
reserve his right. 22 Thereafter the author must rely upon statutory
23
protection.
The common law principles of copyright protection in the United
19 M. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 8.32, at 20; id. § 10.1, at 33; see Waxman, supra note
3, at 52; Comment, Performers' Rights and Copyright: The Protection of Sound Recordings from Modern Pirates, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 548, 555 (1971); Comment, supra note 3,
at 970; Comment, The Twilight Zone: Meanderings In The Area of Performers' Rights, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 819, 820-21 (1962); 56 COLUM. L. REV. 126, 128 (1956).
20 The new statute expressly limits its subject matter to "works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
Works which do not fall within this subject matter classification may still be protected
under state law, or under the common law. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
129-31 (1976). The House Report illustrates several types of intellectual property protectible under either state statute or common law alone:
Examples would include choreography that has never been filmed or notated,
an extemporaneous speech, "original works of authorship" communicated solely
through conversations or live broadcasts, and a dramatic sketch or musical composition improvised or developed from memory and without being recorded or
written down.
Id. at 131.
Renewed interest in the principles of common law copyright has accompanied the
recent trend among students to tape record and transcribe classroom lectures, sometimes
making such transcripts available to their fellows at a handsome profit. See Comment,
Copyright in Live Lecture at the University, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 595 (1970).
21 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976); see id. at 131.
22 See M. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 46, at 183-84; id. § 49, at 194-95. As a result,
many of the cases in this area deal with the question of whether a publication has taken
place. See, e.g., Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358, 362 (D. Mass.
1934) (held: "rendering of [a] performance before the microphone cannot be held to be
an abandonment of ownership to it . . . or a dedication of it to the public at large");
Lennon v. Pulsebeat News, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 309 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1964) (radio broadcast of interviews with The Beatles "not of itself a dedication to the
public"); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42
Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1964) (announcer's dramatic
delivery of news reports relating to assassination of President Kennedy not relegated to
public domain).
23 See M. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 46, at 183-84; id. § 49, at 194-95; note 16 supra.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[8: 678

States are generally acknowledged as having been first enunciated by
Justice McLean's majority opinion in Wheaton v. Peters,2 4 although
similar issues had been dealt with earlier in two cases before lower
courts.2 5 Citing to English precedent, the Wheaton Court concluded
that while an author held pre-publication rights outside the scope of
the federal copyright act then in effect,2 6 the only protection afforded
27
after public dissemination would be statutory.
The Early Copyright Acts
Since America's first copyright act, adopted in 1790,28 did not
provide protection for works in the musical field, common law precepts were the only means available to defend artists' claims to a
29
property interest in interpretive performances.
It was not until 1831 that an amendatory bill was passed which
added "musical composition[s]" to the list of materials eligible for
federal copyright protection. 30 The wording of the legislation made it
apparent, however, that the statute was expanded to cover only printings of musical works, not performances of the same. 3 1 Thus, while
official recognition of a protectible interest in sheet music had been
created, there was still no similar acknowledgment that a performer's
unique delivery of the composition inscribed thereon could be the
subject of a property right.
The right of public performance was statutorily conferred upon
24

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Briefly, Supreme Court Reporter Henry Wheaton sued

his successor for allegedly having reprinted, verbatim, a number of Wheaton's accounts
under the title of Peters' Reports. Id. at 593-95. The Court acknowledged existence of
common law copyright, but denied plaintiff any relief thereunder due to the fact that
general dissemination of the work had been attempted. Id. at 674-77. In addition,
statutory relief was unavailable since the plaintiff apparently had failed to properly register his work with the Copyright Office. Id. at 657, 662--68. The case was remanded for
a factual determination with respect to the latter issue. Id. at 667-68.
25 See Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (No. 4,584); Nichols v. Ruggles, 3 Day 145 (Conn. 1808).
26 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 686, 696-98; see Donaldson v. Becket, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.
1774); Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
27 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 696-98.
28 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. The first federal copyright law
afforded protection only to maps, books and charts. See id. For a general review of the
history of federal copyright legislation, see Grossman, Cycles In Copyright, 22 N.Y.L.S.L.
REv. 653 (1977).
29 For a discussion of cases in which such common law based arguments have been
put forth, see notes 62-93 infra and accompanying text.
30 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436.
31 See id. The only rights reserved for authors of musical compositions were those
"of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending such" works. Id.
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authors of copyrighted material in 1856,32 but, even then, only with
respect to dramatic pieces. 3 3 An exclusive right to perform a copyrighted work "on any stage or public place during the whole period
for which the copyright is obtained"3 4 was, by federal legislation, reserved to the copyright owner, whether that be the dramatist, producer, actor or other person. 3 5 Anyone who performed a protected
composition without the copyright owner's permission became liable
for damages "or other equivalent remedy." 38 This performing right
was extended to musical works in 1897, 3 7 but, as with dramatic
pieces, it inured only to the benefit of that person who held copyright
title.3 8 The original contributions of singers or musicians as such were
not protected by any of the amendatory legislation; performers continued to share in the commercial profitability of a composition only
to the extent that their bargaining position allowed them to negotiate
salutary contracts with those controlling the production. 39 In addition,
since profitable contracts depended on works being available for production, a problem arose insofar as the copyright owner could, at his
discretion, refuse others his permission to use the protected material. 40 This issue, involving the discretionary licensing power inherent
in the copyright grant, remained outstanding as a new call for revision was sounded shortly after the turn of the century.
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
33 Id.
34M.
35 See id. The law protected the holder of copyright title, whoever that might be.
See id.
32

36 Id.

37 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. The act provided that "[a]ny person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical composition for which a
copyright has been obtained, without the consent of the proprietor of said dramatic or
musical composition, or his heirs or assigns, shall be liable ... therefor." id.
38

Id.

39 Indeed, opponents of the performance royalty provision maintain that recording
artists are not only amply compensated by private contractual arrangements, but that
even if a royalty program is established, a performer's financial success will still primarily depend upon factors affecting bargaining strength which a statutory amendment cannot significantly alter. Bard & Kurlantzick, supra note 3, at 160-61; see Hearings on S.
1111, supra note 9, at 81, 90, 93. For an evaluation of such arguments, see notes 13572 infra and accompanying text.
40 The performance rights provisions contained in the early federal statutes required
prospective users of a work to seek permission of the copyright owner, but did not
require the copyright owner to comply with such requests. See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4,
29 Stat. 481; Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. Thus, it was at least theoretically
possible for the copyright owner of a dramatic or musical work to exert an absolute
monopoly over the same by forbidding any public performance of it.
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The 1909 Act
At the instigation of President Theodore Roosevelt, a three-year
effort to "replace the existing insufficient and inconsistent laws by one
general copyright statute" 4 1 was begun late in 1905 "to meet modem
conditions." 42 While early revision drafts called for an unlimited public performance right in music, 43 a compromise provision was later
adopted which limited the copyright proprietor's musical performing
right to situations in which the work was presented both publicly
4 Designated as section
and for profit. A
1(e) of the proposed statute,
the performance right clauses mandated that anyone wishing to perform a copyrighted song in public, and under circumstances such that
a profit or other benefit accrued as a result, would have to secure the
45
copyright holder's permission or be subject to statutory penalties.
Additionally, in light of certain events which accentuated the
emerging importance of mechanical devices capable of reproducing
sound, 46 the performance right clause of the 1909 revision bill re41 Goldman, The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision From 1901 to 1954,
preparedfor Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY 1, at 1 (Comm. Print
1960). The Goldman work is one of 35 studies commissioned by the U.S. Copyright
Office during the late 1950's. Various numbers of these studies have been collected and
published by the Government Printing Office for the Senate Subcomm. on Patent,
Trademarks, and Copyrights. All subsequent citation to those studies will be in their
form as compiled by the GPO and will designate: individual author of the study, title of
work, study number, particular pages referred to in the compilation and year of the
committee print.
42

Id.

43 Varmer, Limitations on Performing Rights, prepared for Subcomm. on Patents,

Trademarks, and Copyrights of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY 16, at 81-82 (Comm. Print 1960). Essentially, the
early drafts would have required potential users of a musical work to secure permission
from the copyright proprietor in all cases, regardless of whether the intended performance was public and for profit. See id. at 82.
44 Hearings on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the House and Senate Comms. on
Patents, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1906) (statement of Arthur Steuart, representative of
the American Bar Association); see Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 1, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075.
45 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 1, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075.
46 Congress was alerted to the activities of the Aeolian Company, a major music
dealer, in its attempt to monopolize the fledgling sound recording business by acquiring
exclusive mechanical reproduction rights from a number of music publishers. Henn, The
Compulsory License Provisions Of The U.S. Copyright Law, preparedfor Subcomm. on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY 5, at 3 & n.20 (Comm. Print 1960); Knight,
Permissible Uses of Copyrighted Music in a Broadcast Licensee's "In House" Productions of Commercials, 25 FED. COM. B.J. 177, 188 & n.3 8 (1973). Aeolian went so far as
to back a test case on the mechanical reproduction provisions contained in pre-1909 law.
Henn, supra; Knight, supra, at 188 n.38. The decision, White-Smith Music Publishing
Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), held that mechanical reproduction (here by means
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served for each copyright holder the exclusive right to make records
of such music as could be recorded and replayed by means of existing
technology. 47 Once the copyright proprietor lost his common law
rights in a composition, however, the act also required that all persons requesting permission to record different versions of the work be
granted such permission in return for predetermined royalty payments.4 8 Thus, the anticipated problem of statutorily protected authors arbitrarily refusing to have their works performed was addressed by balancing the principles of copyright monopoly against a
policy seeking to foster free accessibility to ideas and the creative
arts.4 9 While authors would continue to have their commercial interests protected under federal statute, they could no longer invoke
such law to unreasonably restrain public performances of works desired by society.
These provisions were written into law as part of the Copyright
Act of 1909, signed on March 4 of that year, the last day of Roosevelt's
term. 50 Due to the lack of collective strength among holders of musical copyrights, as well as to practical considerations frustrating effective enforcement, the 1909 Act's performance right clauses were not
of much realistic significance for a number of years following their
enactment. 5 1 With the later formation of various performing rights
organizations, 52 claims by copyright proprietors and by performers
of player-piano rolls) of a published musical work did not violate any of the copyright
proprietor's statutory rights. 209 U.S. at 16-18. Congress responded by enacting § 1(e) of
the 1909 Act, providing for compulsory licensing. See note 48 infra.
47 See Henn, supra note 46, at 3, 7.
as Section l(e) of the Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 1, 35 Stat. 1075, and its companion
provision, § 101(e), provided for this compulsory license system and were drawn largely
in reaction to White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
Knight, supra note 46, at 188-89. See Messina, The Tape Piracy Cases: Judicial Creation
of Federal Copyright Interest in Sound Recordings, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
169, 175-76 (1976); Note, Goldstein v. California-State Copyright Authority Over
Sound Recordings, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 791, 792-93 (1974). See also Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 565-66 (1973). For a general discussion of these provisions, see
J. TAUBMAN, PERFORMING ARTS MANAGEMENT AND LAW §§ 16.1-2, at 553-59 (1972).
For a short discussion of the White-Smith decision, see note 46 supra.
49 See generally Freid, Fair Use And The New Act, 22 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 397, 497
(1977).
50 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 1, 35 Stat. 1075; Grossman, supra note 28, at 665; Ringer
Address, supra note 4.
5' S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 1, at 135; Knight, supra note 46, at
197.
52 The major performing rights societies remain the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC). Briefly, copyright holders assign their
statutory right of public performance to one of the performing right societies which
handles licensing of the work, collects the royalties involved, and distributes these to
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were vigorously advanced in both state and federal courts.5 3 There
consequently developed a body of case law which expanded both the
application and concept of a performance right.
Decisional Law
In general, the holdings between 1915 and 1975 which liberally
interpreted the circumstances under which the 1909 Act's performance right provision should be applied 5 4 did not deal directly with
the question of a sound-recording performance royalty 55 as such.
These decisions naturally concerned themselves with determining
whether an infringement of the statute had taken place in view of the
particular facts involved.56 The cases are important to the subject
matter under discussion, however, in two respects. First, the specific
holdings evidence a trend according to which the act of performance
is implicitly viewed as a commercially valuable thing-a thing in
which a person may have protectible legal rights. 5 7 Second, a number
the appropriate assignor. See B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, supra note 1, at 503-19; S.
SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 1, at 135-42; Finkelstein, Public Performance
Rights in Music and Performance Right Societies, 7 COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED
69 (1951).
5See
note 57 infra.
54 See, e.g., Dreamland Ballroom, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th
Cir. 1929) (dance hall owners liable for copyright infringement where orchestra played
to paying customers even though owner had no control over selections to be played);
Leo Feist, Inc. v. Demarie, 16 F. Supp. 827 (W.D. La. 1935) (orchestra's playing of
copyrighted score from memory, without a license, held to infringe copyright owners'
performance right). Sometimes, however, practical considerations prohibit liberal construction of the provision. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151
(1975) (fast-food shop proprietor's reception of radio broadcast featuring copyrighted
work held not to have infringed copyright owner's performance right). For a good review, set in chronological order, of the other important decisions from 1915 to 1944
which interpret the meaning of "public" and "for profit," see Varmer, supra note 43, at
85-91.
5 The term "performance royalty" as used in this Comment shall apply only to that
federal program which would have statutorily mandated compulsory license benefits for
performers of copyrighted works. It should not be confused with the term "performance
right," which refers to the general right reserved for all holders of copyright title to be
compensated for public use of any copyrighted property. In essence, under a performance royalty program, creative artists would be granted a performance right in their
original renditions of musical works.
56 See Varmer, supra note 43, at 85-91.
57 See RCA Mfg. Co., v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940) ("people easily
distinguish, or think they distinguish, the rendition of the same score or the same text
by their favorites, and they will pay large sums to hear them"); Chaplin v. Amador, 93
Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544, 544 (1928) (appropriation of plaintiff's mannerisms and style
of performance alleged to injure "valuable subsisting good will in such characterization"); Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 18 Misc. 2d 626, 632, 188 N.Y.S.2d 386, 393
(1959) ("the unique quality of the performance and plaintiff's primary property in that performance which constitutes the basis for the action"), rev'd in part, 11 App. Div. 2d 47,

1978]

COMMENT

of the opinions contain unequivocal dicta bearing on the recognition
of performances as copyrightable entities under the Constitution,58
and as works of intellectual property for which their creators should
59
be justly compensated.
Beyond this, a few decisions 60 also exist which directly involved
questions as to whether an artist performing on a sound recording
had a property interest therein due to his having contributed something "novel and artistic,"61 i.e., a distinctive interpretation, to the
final work. These opinions admittedly denied protection for vocalists
and instrumentalists under the 1909 Act, but did recognize the
performer's interest as a protectible right under various theories
such as common law copyright, 6 2 unfair competition 63 and misappro201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 798, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 494 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1950)
("production of an opera by an opera company of skill . . .blending .. .the whole by
expert direction into a finished interpretive production would appear to involve such a
creative element as the law will recognize and protect against appropriation by others");
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 440, 194 A. 631, 635 (1937)
(performers "by their interpretations definitely added something to the work of authors
and composers which not only gained for themselves enduring fame but enabled them
to enjoy financial rewards from the public").
58See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1973) (dicta that "recordings of
artistic performances may be within the reach of" Constitutional protection); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955). In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Learned Hand stated:
I also believe that the performance or rendition of a "musical composition"
is a "Writing" under Article I, § 8, Cl. 8 of the Constitution separate from, and
additional to, the "composition" itself. It follows that Congress could grant the
performer a copyright upon it, provided it was embodied in a physical form
capable of being copied.
Id. at 664.
59See cases cited in note 57 supra.
60
E.g., Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal.
1950); Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 18 Misc. 2d 626, 188 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1959), rev'd
in part, 11 App. Div. 2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960); cf. Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300
F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (spoken word).
61 Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, .440, 194 A. 631, 634
(1937).
62 See, e.g., id. at 438-39, 194 A. at 634; notes 14-26 supra.
63This action, arising under the common law, was formulated to protect against
situations in which one party "passes off" his product as that of another. It originally
was applied in trademark cases where a defendant was alleged to have adopted a mark
or name belonging to the plaintiff. See Comment, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV., supra note 19, at
840-42; Note, supra note 3, at 709-10. Although there is no uniformly accepted statement as to the elements of this cause of action, plaintiffs have generally been required
to demonstrate one or more of the following: (1) an actual "passing off" or deception
designed to induce the public to believe that plaintiff's product is actually the defendant's; (2) a property interest in the product alleged to have been passed off; and (3)
evidence of actual commercial competition between the plaintiff and the defendant. See
Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962); Metropolitan Opera
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priation. 6 4

The most often cited case in which protection was extended to a
performer remains Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station. 65 In War66
ing, the question of a performer's right was one of first impression.
Fred Waring, conductor and principal owner of the widely-acclaimed
orchestra known as "Fred Waring's Pennsylvanians," brought suit
against a radio station's corporate owner for unauthorized broadcast of
records made by the group. 6 7 According to an agreement between
Waring and the record company involved, a label had been affixed to
each disc "reading: 'Not licensed for radio broadcast.' "68 The defendant purchased a copy of the record and, after securing permission to
broadcast it from ASCAP, to whom the copyright proprietors had assigned their statutory right of public performance, played the work
during regular programming. 6 9 Noting that distinctive interpretations
of a musical composition may be considered "independent works of
art, '"70 the Pennsylvania supreme court enjoined further broadcast of
Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 792-98, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483,
488-94 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1950); Comment, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV., supra, at
841-49. Courts have more recently placed little or no emphasis on the necessity of having to show these requisites in order to sustain the cause of action. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, 199 Misc. at 796, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 492 ("modern view as to the law of
unfair competition . . . rest[s] . . . on the broader principle that property rights of
commercial value are to be and will be protected from any form of unfair invasion").
For in-depth discussions of this area of the law, see Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53
HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1940); Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4
HARV. L. REV. 321 (1891).
64 An outgrowth of the unfair competition laws, the misappropriation doctrine developed from situations where a property right of one party was alleged to have been
unfairly obtained by another, but where that latter party did not pass off a product as his
own. See Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11 VAND. L.
REV. 483, 487-93 (1958); Note, Performer's Style-A Quest for Ascertainment, Recognition, and Protection, 52 DEN. L.J. 561, 585 (1975). Whereas unfair competition actions
usually involved specific property rights, misappropriation cases often concern general
business conduct. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 240 (1918) ("the process amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal
operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is
to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit from those who have
earned it to those who have not"). One commentator has identified three elements
which commonly must be shown for the action to lie: (a) some type of property right in
the thing taken; (b) unfair appropriation by the defendant, and (c) the defendant stands
to gain a profit from that unfair taking. Comment, The MisappropriationDoctrine After
Sears-Compco, 2 U.S.F. L. REV. 292, 295 (1968).
65 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
66 Id. at 435, 194 A. at 632.
67 Id. at 436-37, 194 A. at 632-33.
68 Id.
at 436, 194 A. at 633 (footnote omitted).
69 Id. at 437, 194 A. at 633.
70 Id.
at 441, 194 A. at 635.
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the recording based on principles of common law copyright and unfair
competition. 7 1 In contrast, performers were contemporaneously denied similar relief in other jurisdictions, not because these forums discounted the existence of a performance right in sound recordings, but
because it was held that all rights had been assigned to the subject
72
record companies.
The vitality of the Waring decision was undeniably circumscribed
by Judge Learned Hand's majority opinion in RCA Mfg. Co. v.
Whiteman, 73 a case factually on the order of Waring itself. 74 Putting
much emphasis on a strict interpretation of the common law, 75 the
Second Circuit held that orchestra leader Paul Whiteman could not
exercise control over recordings his group had made for RCA after
the discs were sold. 7 6 The court reasoned that a sale of records constituted a dedication of them to the general public, and since any
right Whiteman had was founded in common law, such right was
77
thereby extinguished.
In addition, Whiteman's claim of unfair competition was denied
after the court determined that the case upon which he relied for that
78
cause of action, InternationalNews Service v. The Associated Press,
"must be confined to that [decision's factual] situation." 79 Thus, as the
RCA court stated, the unfair competition claim "cannot be used as a
cover to prevent competitors from ever appropriating the results of
the industry, skill, and expense of others." 8 0 Much of the analysis
leading to this conclusion focused on the concept of equitable servitude. 8 1 Analogizing to patent law, the court noted that to place re71 Id. at 447-49, 455-56, 194 A. at 638, 641-42. In addition, the concurring opinion
of Justice Maxey indicated that he would have granted relief primarily on the basis that
plaintiffs' right of privacy had been violated. Id. at 458-63, 194 A. at 642-45.
72 See Noble v. One Sixty Commonwealth Avenue, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mass.
1937); Crumit v. Marcus Loew Booking Agency, 162 Misc. 225, 293 N.Y.S. 63 (Sup. Ct.
1936).
73 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
74 Bandleader Paul Whiteman brought suit against a radio station, and against its
corporate owner, to prevent their broadcasting of a record made by Whiteman's orchestra which carried the warning " 'Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast.' " 114 F.2d at

87.
71 Id. at 88.
76 Id. at 88, 90.
77 Id.
78 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
79 114 F.2d at 90. For a discussion of the International News Service case as it
relates to the cause of action in unfair competition, see note 64 supra.
80 114 F.2d at 90.
81
Id. at 88.
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strictions on the purchaser's use of a product, effective after the product is sold, is a practice considered to be generally illegal and always
disfavored.8 2 Having lost his common law copyright in the records,
Whiteman was therefore found to have no further right to "control
the activities of the public"8' 3 with regard to its use of those
84
records.
What is important to note about the RCA decision, however, is
this: the court did not discredit the claim that a performer may have
a legally recognizable property interest in his performance. Judge
Hand was apparently concerned that the holding would be recognized
as an aberration of the common law,8 5 and would promote discontinuity among state copyright enactments. 86 In fact, some fifteen
years after his opinion in RCA, Hand authored a cogent dissent which
unmistakably revealed his belief in the copyrightability of the act of
performance. 87 Although this later case, Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Mercury Records Corp. ,88 centered on other issues,8 9 Hand's opinion
asserted that a distinctive style of performance should be eligible for
statutory copyright protection since its creation involves original intellectual effort capable of embodiment as a sound recording.9 0 In light
of this pronouncement, as well as certain dicta contained in RCA v.
Whiteman itself,9 1 the latter decision should not be seen as a judicial
rejection of the performance right concept. Rather it should be viewed
as a determination to avoid making bad law from an otherwise
meritorious claim-a claim, as Hand twice noted, 92 which would
93
more appropriately be resolved by the legislative branch.
Thus a trend can be discerned throughout the early history of
the nation's copyright law, as well as through the judicial process
which examined and interpreted that law. The trend has been toward
recognition of the act of musical performance as an entity in which
persons may have legally protectible rights. While it was well-settled
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
84 Id. A final count alleging invasion of privacy was dismissed with little discussion
82
83

as a "strange assertion." Id.
85 See id. at 89.
86 Id.
at 89-90.
87 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 666 (2d Cir. 1955);
see note 58 supra.
88 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
89See 114 F.2d at 90.

90 221 F.2d at 664; see note 133 infra.
91 See 114 F.2d at 88.
92

93

Id.
Id.
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that copyright proprietors and licensees were within the scope of
statutory protection, legal authorities remained split as to the propriety and manner of extending statutory rights to performers as the
second effort to revise federal copyright law was launched in 1955.
The Revision Effort & The Performance Royalty
Activities leading to the present revision bill's passage are generally acknowledged as having begun with the drafting of some thirtyfive research studies on copyright law revision, commissioned by the
U.S. Copyright Office in 1955. 9 4 These papers, prepared by various
authorities in the copyright field and titled by subject matter, reviewed the state of American law with regard to various aspects of
95
copyright practice. Topics included The Moral Right of the Author,
94 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1975); Brennan, supra note 9, at 194; Comment, 49 CALIF. L. REV.,
supra note 19, at 570. Congress gave the study project official life when it provided
money to sustain it in the Legislative Appropriations Act of 1955. See Act of Aug. 5,
1955, ch. 568, 69 Stat. 499. The individual monographs have since been collected and
published in a two-volume set entitled Studies on Copyright (Copyright Office, Arthur
Fisher Mem. Ed. 1963).
Although not directly associated with the most current revision effort, earlier legislative attempts were made to amend the 1909 Act, some of definite beneficial interest to
performing artists. In 1936, for example, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives mandating statutory copyright protection for "all renditions and interpretations of a performer and/or interpreter of any musical . . . work, or other compositions,
whatever the mode or form of such renditions, performances, or interpretations." H.R.
10632, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1936). Along with a similar measure also introduced in
the House during that year, the so-called "Daly Bill" (named after its sponsor, Rep.
Richard J. Daly) attracted considerable attention during congressional hearings at which
powerful interests within the entertainment field aired their views. See Hearings on
H.R. 10632 Before the House Comm. on Patents on Revision of the Copyright Laws,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 655-68, 673-95 (1936). Performers argued that broadcasters used
their recorded performances for unfair commercial purposes, the most pointed of which
was the practice of re-recording songs in a style which the performer had already made
popular and utilizing the same for private advertising. Id. at 655-56. Both bills died in
committee after opponents (including ASCAP, juke box manufacturers and motion picture producers) criticized the proposals as being too vague, "unconstitutional [and] seriously prejudicial to their legitimate interests." Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplicationof
Sound Recordings, prepared for Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
STUDY 26, at 29 (Comm. Print 1961); see Hearings on H.R. 10632 Before the House
Comm. on Patents on Revision of the Copyright Laws, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 560-62,
655-62 (1936). A number of other bills, all proposing some form of an expanded performance right, were introduced in Congress during the period extending from 1925 to
1940 as part of the early revision effort. See Varmer, supra note 43, at 96-103. In the
face of opposition from various elements in the broadcasting industry, none of these
measures advanced beyond the stage of examination by a congressional committee. See
id.; Ringer, supra at 21-32.
95 Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, prepared for Subcomm. on Patents,
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The Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License, 96 Limitations on
Performing Rights 97 and The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings. 98 Commentary on these reports was solicited from various
members of the copyright bar in an attempt to widen interest in the
revision effort. 99
The topics and issues raised in these studies were, in turn, reviewed at length in reports issued to Congress by the Register of
Copyrights in 1961 and 1965.100 Those documents not only recapitulated the state of the law, but also contained concrete proposals for
congressional action.1 01 Enough interest in copyright law revision was
02
generated by 1964 that a prototype amendatory bill was introduced
which, after twelve years of private maneuvering, substantive revision
and political compromise, 10 3 eventually resulted in adoption of the
1976 Act.
Trademarks, and Copyrights of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY 4, at 109-42 (Comm. Print 1960). For a related discussion of this topic, see note 107 infra.
96 Blaisdell, The Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License, preparedfor Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY 6, at 87-113 (Comm. Print 1960).
97Varmer, supra note 43, at 77-119.
98 Ringer, supra note 94, at ix-50.
99 These observations were appended to each report as it was published and reflect
arguments, both pro and con, to the issues raised in each particular study. See, for
example, the comments on William Blaisdell's monograph, supra note 96. While one
writer notes that "Mr. Blaisdell's memorandum .. .strengthens my belief that the present scheme of compulsory licenses in section 1(e) should be altogether discarded,"
another states that "abolition of compulsory licensing would . . . seriously injure the
entire music industry with consequent damage to the consuming public." Blaisdell,
supra note 96, at 120-21 (reprinted comments of Ralph S. Brown, Jr. and Ernest S.
Meyers).
100 Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 481 &
nn. 15-16 (1977). For a detailed comparison of the Register's recommendations and the
provisions of the 1976 Act, see id. at 477, 482-90. The recommendations, on the whole,
were cautious, suggesting changes less dramatic than those actually adopted. See id. at
482.
101 See generally note 100 supra. For example, the Register's 1961 report advocated
repeal of the provisions requiring those making records of copyrighted music to pay a
compulsory license fee. Ringer, supra note 100, at 486. Not only was this licensing
provision retained in the revision bill, but three new compulsory licensing rights were
established. Id. at 487.
102S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
103 Most of the haggling was over how a revised statute should deal with cable
television, photoduplication of copyrighted works, whether jukeboxes "performed"
copyrighted work and the performance royalty question. Ringer Address, supra note 4;
see Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 73-74; PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No.
238, July 31, 1975, at A-8 to -11; 120 CONG. REC. 30,480-84 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974). Detractors remained "opposed to the principle of the [performance] bill," Hearings on S.
1111, supra note 9, at 74, even though the Register of Copyrights concluded it was con-

stitutional, id. at 11, and even though Nancy Hanks, former chairman of the National
Endowment for the Arts, strongly endorsed the measure. Id. at 4-8.
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Congressional support for the performance royalty proposal itself
was slow in materializing throughout this period, apparently for two
reasons. First, the emphasis of prior copyright legislation had focused
10 4
on the protection of economic interests, not of artistic integrity.
Although one of the major arguments made in favor of the performance royalty is based upon the notion that there should be economic parity among co-producers of a single product, 10 5 another is
founded upon moral concepts. The latter submits that such a program
would bring the United States in line with a majority of other countries 10 6 whose governments have long provided for royalty compensation to performers, apparently based on their recognition of the performers' moral right 10 7 to receive such payment.
104 Preoccupation with the material benefits of artistic endeavor is demonstrated in
the language of even the earliest colonial legislation. For example, the New Jersey Act
of May 27, 1783 begins by making the point that "it is perfectly agreeable to the principles of equity, that men of learning who devote their time and talents to the preparing
treatises [sic] for publication, should have the profits that may arise from the sale of
their works . .." Preambles to the copyright acts of colonial Connecticut, Georgia, and
New York also point to the importance of protecting each author's right to "profits." See
Copyright Enactments, supra note 2, at 9, 27 & 27 [sic] (twenty-eighth page of work
misnumbered as twenty-seven). Although the language employed in federal copyright
law does not have such an obvious commercial orientation, the rationale behind the law
does. The rationale is essentially this: in order to encourage both scientific and artistic
efforts, the law will secure for those who undertake such endeavors the right to enjoy
whatever benefit is earned therefrom. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555
(1973). As stated by Justice Reed in the majority opinion of Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954), "[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors .... See also Case Conment, Alonty Python and the La, ha Act: In Search
of the Moral Right, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 452, 456-57 (1977).
105For a discussion of the economic argument advanced by proponents of the performance royalty, see notes 120-50 infra and accompanying text.
106 Those countries which recognized a performance right in sound recordings as of
1975 were: Australia, Austria, Barbados, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, West Germany, Iceland, India,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malawi, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Paraguay, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom. See 2 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
1975, at 119-24 (PLI 1975); Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 5, 60.
It is ironic that such protection is available even in Communist countries. See 2
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1975, supra at 119-24 (performance
right recognized in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and Rumania); Hearings on
S. 1111, supra at 5, 60 (acknowledgment of performance right recognition in U.S.S.R.).
107 Many of those countries cited for their recognition of a performance right in
sound recordings, see note 106 supra, are signatories to one or more international
copyright conventions which incorporate moral right provisions into their terms. See
Strauss, supra note 95, at 140-41; Abelman & Berkowitz, International Copyright Law,
22 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 619, 647-51 (1977); Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership to
Intellectual Property: Part II-From the Age of Printing to the Future, 7 MEM. ST. U.
L. REV. 45, 72-73 (1976).
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Second, as research and discussion on the issue made it increasingly clear that a performance royalty program would involve novel
allocations of large sums 10 8 within the recording and broadcast industries, the controversy resolved itself, not as one focusing on adaptaThe moral right of an author has recently been defined as being an amalgam of the
following subsidiary privileges:
1. The Right of Creation, which includes (a) the right to create a work; (b)
the right to print or publish or not to publish; and (c)the right to prevent excess
criticism of a work, and to reply to unjust criticism.
2. The Right of Paternity, which includes (a) the right of recognition that a
certain person wrote a certain work; (b) the right of the author to prevent others
from being credited with the creation of a work; and (c) the right to prevent
others from attributing to a certain person the creation of a work which he did
not write.
3. The Right of Integrity, which includes (a) the right of the author to prevent others from altering the work so as to distort, deform or mutilate it; (b) the
right of an author to modify, change or correct a published work, or to withdraw
it from distribution if it no longer represents the views or scholarship of the
author; and (c) the right of the author to prevent others from using the work, or
the author's name, in such a manner as to reflect on his personal or professional
standing or reputation.
4. Undetermined Moral Rights.
Id. at 74 (footnote omitted); see Comment, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the
Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 578 (1940). Although discussing the American judiciary, and not Congress, Streibich notes one "major factor"
responsible for the failure of lawmakers to embrace the doctrine in this country is simply that they "do not understand moral right and tend to be afraid of what they do not
understand." Streibich, supra at 73.
In simplest form, the right is that "of the creator to create, to present his creation to
the public in any desired form or to withhold it, and to demand from everyone respect
for his personality as creator and for his works." Comment, supra at 578 (translating G.
MICHAELIDES-NOUARA, LE DROIT MORAL DE L'AUTEUR 68 (1935)).
The essence of this personal right may be gleaned from an exchange which took
place during a recent federal case that involved much discussion of the moral right. In
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), the English comedy
group Monty Python brought suit against ABC seeking an injunction to prevent the
latter's re-edited showing of a television special. During an earlier phase of this action,
Monty Python member Michael Palin remarked that ABC's re-editing work made the
individual members look like "fools."
The Court: I thought that was your business, being fools.
Mr. Palin: Well, on our own terms.
Remarks of Michael Palin, record, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Civ. No. 756256 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1975), as quoted in THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 29, 1976, at 69.
The principle of moral right has been embodied in the long-standing international
copyright agreement known as the Berne Convention, to which over 35 countries have
subscribed. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
June 26, 1948 (Brussels), art. 6(2), 6(3), reprinted in 11 UNESCO COPYRIGHT 114
(1948).
108One study has indicated that over $10 million would be collected from radio
broadcasters for distribution to performers in the first year of the program's existence.
See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 64 (Exhibit 6). For a discussion of the proposed rates of payment under the performance royalty clause, see note 154 infra.
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tion of an ethical concept into economically-oriented legislation, but
in terms of how to strike a compromise among major, and diametrically opposed, private interests. 10 9 As a result of those problems,
protracted effort was necessary merely to bring before Congress a
clear definition of the issue involved with a performance royalty.
For example, in a pre-1955 revision study conducted with regard
to a specific bill," 0 a congressional committee refused to provide for
a performance royalty system, reporting that " 'thought had not yet
become crystallized on the subject . . . and no way could be found at
[that] time for reconciling the serious conflicts of interest arising in
the field.' ""
The Register's 1961 report was equally inconclusive. Using lan109 Virtually every commentator who has discussed one or more of the performance
rights proposals notes that major interests in the entertainment industry have organized
in opposition to performing rights groups. See, e.g., Grossman, Cycles in Copyright, 22
N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 653, 666-67 (1977) ("[tlhis latest bill was strongly favored by representatives of authors, artists, composers . . . [and opposed by] mechanical music interests,
radio broadcasters and art dealers"); Ringer, supra note 94, at 29 (footnote omitted)
("leading opponents [to protection for performers] were ASCAP, the broadcasting organizations, the Music Publishers Association, the jukebox manufacturers, and the motion picture producers."); Waxman, supra note 3, at 76 ("[b]roadcasters, of course, are
opposed to paying any license fee for performance rights in the recordings they air");
PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 293, Sept. 2, 1976, at A-5 (testimony given to
congressional committee by "representatives of the record industry, performers, labor,
broadcasters, and jukebox operators" whose views "were unchanged."); Note, The Right
of Public Performance in Sound Recordings, 15 How. L.J. 452, 462 (1969) (opposition to
the clause expressed by "[s]ongwriters and publishers and those claiming through
them"); Legislation Note, Revision of the Copy/right Law, 51 HARV. L. REV. 906, 916
(1938).
At least one congressional witness has also commented on a possible reason why
those opposed to the performance royalty have consistently been able to muster significant political support:
We know the direct economic nexus between the broadcasting industry and the
newspaper industry. We know, too, [the] inevitable dependence of people seeking public office on the good will of those who own the media of our country.
We know, finally, that there is a sizable number of Members of Congress who
have financial interests in radio stations. So we are not insensible to the awesome political opposition we face.
Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 39 (statement of Henry Kaiser, general counsel,
American Federation of Musicians, AFL-CIO).
1o S. 3043, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940). The proposal remains popularly known as
the "Shotwell Bill," after Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia University who
chaired the then-existing Committee for the Study of Copyright. Goldman, supra note
41, at 10-12. The bill, which would have revised American copyright law so as to make
this country eligible for membership in the Berne Convention, was never reported out
of committee. Id.
I" Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 19 (testimony of Sanford I. Wolff, executive secretary, American Federation of Television & Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, quoting
from a Senate report on S. 3043).
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guage reminiscent of the pre-1955 study, the Register recounted both
sides of the argument and indicated that all issues involved with the
performance royalty " 'have not yet crystallized,' and that 'detailed
recommendations are being deferred pending further study.'-"12
Similarly, in 1966, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted, in
reviewing that year's report of the Register, that while arguments in
favor of the performance royalty might be meritorious, such arguments were insufficient to overcome the opposing influence of private
interests. 11 As a result, it left " 'the possibility of full consideration of
the question [to] a future Congress.' "114
Such "full consideration" was but a year away, however, with the
introduction, by Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. of New Jersey, of
an amendment 15 specifically designed to provide for performance
royalties under a then-pending version of the Senate's copyright revision bill. Although broadcasting interests were successful in keeping
this amendatory bill from being voted upon, 116 the Williams Amendment remains significant insofar as its provisions served as precursors
for those contained in section 33 of S. 1111, which itself almost became part of the new copyright law in 1976.117
Section 33 mandated that a minimum compulsory license fee be
112 Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 19 (testimony of Sanford I. Wolff, executive
secretary, American Federation of Television & Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, quoting from
Register of Copyrights' 1961 address to Congress).
113See H.R. REP. No. 223, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 93-95 (1966).
114 H.R. REP. No. 223, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1966). The Register unequivocally
demonstrated a strong personal viewpoint on the propriety of a performance right only a
year earlier, however:
Let me say plainly there is no doubt in my mind that recorded performances
represent the "'writings" of an "author" in the constitutional sense and are as
fully creative and worthy of copyright protection as translations, arrangements
or any other class of derivative work. I also believe that the contributions of the
record producer to a great many sound recordings also represent true authorship and are just as entitled to protection as motion pictures and photographs
.... There is much to be said for this point of view, and it is possible that this
right will eventually be recognized in the copyright law of the United States as
it is now in other countries....
Hearings on H.R. 4347 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1863 (1965).
'15 Performers' Amendment, S. Amend. No. 9 to S. 543, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
The amendment would have set up a performance royalty program similar to that eventually proposed for the revision bill, i.e., one founded upon compulsory license payments exacted from users of recorded performances. Id. § 1.
116See generally Comment, 59 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 19, at 574.
117 See PAT., T.M. & COPYRUGHT J. (BNA), No. 298, Oct. 7, 1976, at A-1. The per-

formance right amendment to S. 1361, another Senate version of the copyright revision
bill, was deleted by a vote of 67 to 8, with 24 Senators not voting. 120 CONG. REc. 30,484
(daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974).

19781

COMMENT

paid by radio and television broadcasting stations, through the Copyright Office, to both the performers on, and the copyright owners of,
every sound recording broadcast by such stations." 8 In essence, the
measure would have given performers of copyrighted works the same
compulsory license benefits as traditionally have been conferred upon
those holding copyright title to the works performed. 119 As on previous occasions when the performance royalty question was given serious consideration,' 2 ° powerful special interests in the broadcasting
industry' 2 ' mustered enough support 1 22 to prevent the provision from
becoming law. Instead, a compromise was reached 2 3 whereby the
118See S. 1111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(f)(2), 33(a),(c) (1975), reprinted in Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 2-4. Payments would be graduated according to each
station's gross advertising revenues. For example, a radio station wishing to play recorded performances of copyrighted music and having gross advertising income of between $25,000 and $100,000 a year would pay an annual performance royalty of $250. S.
1111 § 33(a)(1)(A) (1975), reprinted in Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 3. Stations
receiving between $100,000 and $200,000 in gross advertising revenues would pay $750
yearly, and those with gross receipts of more than $200,000 would remit one percent of
their net advertising revenues. S. 1111 § 33(a)(1)(B),(C) (1975), reprinted in Hearings on
S. 1111, supra note 9, at 3. Although higher, independently negotiated rates of payment
would be allowed, at least two commentators have suggested the obvious point that
broadcasters would not be likely to pay more than they have to for something they
originally had use of without cost. See Bard & Kurlantzick, supra note 3, at 174-75.
According to a study prepared for the Recording Industry Association of America,
Inc. in 1972, some 46 radio stations in New Jersey would fall into one of the three
advertising-revenue categories requiring payment of a yearly performance royalty. See
Hearings onl S. 1111, supra note 9, table, at 47-48. Some 4,880 stations nationwide
would be similarly affected. Id. at 48.
119See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
i2o See note 109 supra.
121 Two of the major networks filed statements with the Senate Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, with ABC calling the proposal "an unwise and
unnecessary extention [sic] of the copyright laws," while NBC stated that the performance royalty program "neither makes sense economically nor comports with the Constitutional purpose of copyright." Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 89, 93. Both
networks are partially comprised of a number of radio stations that would be required to
make royalty payments. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., SONGPLUGGING AND THE AIRWAVES: A FUNCTIONAL

OUTLINE OF THE POPULAR MUSIC BUSINESS 10-12 (Sub. Comm. Print 1960). See also
notes 10 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
122 Among those speaking against inclusion of the performance royalty clause in that
version of the revision bill proposed by the Senate as S. 1361 were Senators Ervin,
Thurmond, Gurney, Packwood and Pastore. See 120 CONG. REC. 30,399-408, 30,480-84
(daily ed. Sept. 6, 1974).
123 It was frankly admitted by the Register of Copyrights, herself a strong advocate
of the performance royalty, that the provision was potentially so controversial it might
have to be sacrificed in order to preserve support for the revision bill as a whole. As she
stated during hearings on S. 1111:
it must be said, on the basis of experience, that if this legislation were tied to
the fate of the bill for general revision of the copyright law there is a danger
that it could turn into a "killer" provision that would again stall or defeat the
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Register of Copyrights was statutorily instructed to consult with representatives of all groups directly interested in the performance royalty question and report to Congress on the advisability of adopting
such a provision. 124 Thus, official thought on the royalty clause is still
in the process of becoming "crystallized."
The Legal Argument
It should be clear, in considering the propriety of a statutory
performance royalty, that American intellectual property law does not
in any way militate against the granting of such rights to performers.
Indeed, considerations of private interest aside, 12 5 the law would
seem clearly to mandate such a grant. Constitutional provisions empowering Congress "'[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts" 12 6 have been expansively interpreted so that virtually every
field of artistic endeavor 12 7 has become eligible for statutory protecomnibus legislation. This danger exists, and it would be very real if the potential compulsory licensees, notably the broadcasting and jukebox industries,
exerted their considerable economic and political power to oppose the revision
bill as a whole. Should this happen, there could be no question about priorities;
the performance royalty for sound recordings would have to yield to the overwhelming need for omnibus reform of the 1909 copyright law.
Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 17 (testimony of Hon. Barbara A. Ringer).
Commenting on the nature of the Senate bill which eventually served as the basis
of the text of the new law, Representative Robert Kastenmeier noted:
S. 22 is basically economic legislation which affects a variety of industries and
interest groups. Of course, it is impossible to draft a copyright bill which will
meet with the approval of every interested party. I believe that we have been
successful in writing a bill which resolves the conflicts among the various parties as successfully as is humanly possible.
122 CONG. REc. 10,874-75 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
This view of the new act, as being a delicate balance, has been shared by Representative Thomas Railsback who commented "[a] change in any one sentence may tilt that
balance in such a way so as to unravel the entire bill." Id. at 10,877 (remarks of Rep.
Railsback). The Register herself, acknowledging the statements of both congressmen,
recently noted that "the outcome [of the revision effort is] so precarious that the
realities of the present situation are hard to grasp." Ringer, supra note 100, at 477 (footnote omitted).
124 See note 13 supra.
125 See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The full text of the clause reads as follows:
The Congress shall have Power...
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.
127 See, e.g.,
17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (pantomime and
choreography); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1973) (Court recognized
that copyright statute was continually expanded to provide protection for engravers,
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tion at "the discretion of the Congress." 12 8 Having already determined the legality of providing statutory copyright benefits for those
who possess title to the music recorded, 1 29 as well as for those holding title to the sound recordings themselves, 30 it is apparent that
neither Congress nor the courts will find it legally impermissible to
extend such favor to performers "who elevate interpretations to the
realm of independent works of art.'131 The justifying rationale behind
a grant to performers would, indeed, be the same as that supporting
the protection presently available to copyright title holders. Statutory
protection would be accorded to the commercial interests 3 2 of those
composers, photographers, sculptors and motion picture producers); Waring v. WDAS,
327 Pa. at 437, 194 A. at 633 (same for lectures and drama).
128 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1973). The opinion notes that the two
factors which weigh most heavily in determining whether Congress will extend copyright protection to a creation are "the character of the" work, and its "commercial importance . .. to the national economy." Id.
129 See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text.

130See 17 U.S.CA. §§ 102(a)(7), 106(1), 114(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). The new
statute essentially embodies the provisions of amendatory legislation, passed on Oct. 14,
1971, creating copyright protection for sound recordings themselves. See Pub. L. No.
92-140, 85 Stat. 391. See generally Comment, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 964, supra note 3.
See also Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1972) (constitutional attack on
sound recordings amendment rejected).
131Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. at 440-42, 194 A. at 635; see notes 57-72 supra and
accompanying text.
Indeed, even though the performance royalty clause was dealt a crippling blow in
the Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee itself has stated that, in the opinion of its
members, copyright protection is warranted for the "performer whose performance is
captured and . . . the record producer responsible for setting up the recording session
and electronically processing the sound and compiling and editing them to make the
final sound recording." S. REP. No. 92-72, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1974). This view
has also been strongly advocated by the current Register of Copyrights who, after reviewing the pertinent law in a letter to Sen. Hugh Scott, concluded that "there is no
odubt [sic] in my mind as to the constitutionality of the performance royalty." Letter
from Hon. Barbara Ringer to Sen. Hugh Scott, July 31, 1974, reprinted in 120 CONG.
REC. 30,482-83 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974).
132See note 104 supra and accompanying text. According to the 1970 census, the
annual median income for musicians in this country was $4,668. 1970 Report of the
Census Bureau of the United States. In addition, those unions which represent performers have reported high unemployment rates among their members in recent years. See
Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 31 (statement of Andrew Biemiller, Director,
Legislative Department, AFL-CIO). Although a performance royalty program would
provide at least marginal income for this group of unrecognized artists, opponents of the
measure have, in the past, effectively taken the focus off the unheralded musician and
instead emphasized how unnecessary it would be to mandate supplemental payments
for his renowned, and well paid, counterpart. In argument against Senate adoption of a
performance royalty measure in 1974, for example, it was stated:
MR. PASTORE: ....

Here we are, the Congress of the United States; when everyone is talking
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who create an identifiable work 133 of intellectual property.
about the cost of living, the scarcity of meat, the prices of food, unemployment
in this country, here we are, going to pay a premium, a royalty, to all these
$2,000-a-week singers out there in Las Vegas.
MR. BIBLE: And Reno.
MR. PASTORE: And Reno. I think we have other, more important, things to do,
Mr. President, and that is why I think . . .all these entertainers who are living
on the plush of the world [should] begin to pay their [own] way.
120 CONG. REc. 30,479 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974). This argument was countered, as might
be expected, by the contention that "for every Frank Sinatra or Bing Crosby there are
literally thousands of creative artists, musicians, singers, and others who never attain the
rewards earned by a few superstars." 120 CONG. REC. 30,481 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974)
(remarks of Sen. Cranston). It has been noted that even performers who were once the
subject of public acclaim may find need for supplemental royalty payments as their
fortunes decline:
Many famous artists, such as Ernie Ford, Mitch Miller, and Pat Boone, sell
fewer records today, but airplay of their old records remains heavy. Some radio
stations still offer the recorded music of Nat King Cole, and ". . . everyone
benefits but Nat Cole's widow and children. The sponsor attracts an audience
with one of the top vocalists of our generation, and the radio stations sells [sic]
time to the sponsor, the writers and publishers of the songs are paid performance fees for the boardcast [sic] of these songs, but Nat Cole's widow and
children receive absolutely nothing, nor does the record company that spent 20
years building him as a top recording artist, and owns the masters which are
used for these delayed performances."
Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 50 (statement of Stanley M. Gortikov, President,
Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.).
133Recognition of a performer's interpretive rendition of a work as being an entity
suitable for copyright protection has been acknowledged by various authorities. The
Senate Judiciary Committee, for example, reported in 1974 that: "[r]ecords are 'writings'
and performers can be regarded as 'authors' since their contributions amount to original
intellectual creations." S. REP. No. 93-983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 140 (1974). That same
year, the Register of Copyrights wrote to Congress:
In my opinion, the contributions of both performers and record producers are
clearly the "writings of an author" in the constitutional sense, and are as fully
worthy of protection as any of the many different kinds of "derivative works"
accorded protection under the Federal copyright statute.
120 CONG. REC. 30,483 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974).
These congressional and administrative conclusions were anticipated some nineteen
years earlier in the dissenting opinion of Learned Hand in Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955). Judge Hand stated:
I also believe that the performance or rendition of a "musical composition"
is a "Writing" under Article I, § 8, Cl. 8 of the Constitution separate from, and
additional to, the "composition" itself. It follows that Congress could grant the
performer a copyright upon it, provided it was embodied in a physical form
capable of being copied. The propriety of this appears, when we reflect that a
musical score in ordinary notation does not determine the entire performance,
certainly not when it is sung or played on a stringed or wind instrument. Musical notes are composed of a "fundamental note" with harmonics and overtones
which do not appear on the score. There may indeed be instruments-e.g.
percussive-which do not allow any latitude, though I doubt even that; but in
the vast number of renditions, the performer has a wide choice, depending
upon his gifts, and this makes his rendition pro tanto quite as original a "com-
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Thus, the novel feature of a performance right in sound recordings would not be the legal reasoning underlying it. The only major
difference between such a grant and the one already existing for
copyright title holders would simply be that the performance royalty
would benefit a new class of persons, namely, performers. 13 4 Should
Congress have the will to provide for a performance royalty, it is
clear that a legal means of doing so exists.
The Equitable/EconomicArgument
The underlying issue of the performance royalty question, often
raised by critics of the proposal, is why Congress should confer compulsory license privileges upon performers, even if a feasible method
of doing so is available. The answer has essentially been two-fold: first,
implementation of a performance royalty program will resolve longstanding inequities surrounding the allocation of revenue generated
by the cooperative effort of record production; 3 5 second, additional
136
capital made available through the program to record companies
position" as an "arrangement" or "adaptation" of the score itself .... Now that
it has become possible to capture these contributions of the individual performer upon a physical object that can be made to reproduce them, there
should be no doubt that this is within the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
Id. at 664. See text accompanying notes 85-93 supra.
1-4 The compulsory licensing systems established by the new act for the benefit of
those holding copyright title to sound recordings themselves is virtually identical to that
which has been proposed for performers. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (West Cum. Supp.
1977). A similar royalty program has also been created for the benefit of those television
broadcasters whose primary transmissions are used by cable stations. See id. § 111.
Proponents of the performance royalty have noted an apparent contradiction in the position of the television networks, whose spokesmen argue that it is unfair for cable systems to re-broadcast the product of commercial stations without paying for the privilege,
but who, at the same time, oppose legislation which would require them to render compensation for the networks' use of recorded performances. As stated during congressional hearings in 1975:
On July 8, Mr. Arthur Taylor, president of CBS, told the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly that he was concerned about cable television
because it operates outside the copyright structure, profiting from attractions of
free television, but not paying for them. Similarly, America's performing artists
and their unions are concerned that the broadcasters and their advertising sponsors .. .are profiting from the commercial use of recordings but are not paying
appropriately for them.
Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 29 (remarks of Jack Golodner, executive secretary,
Council for Professional Employees, AFL-CIO).
135 The merits of this particular argument have already been acknowledged by at
least two commentators otherwise opposed to the performance royalty proposal. See
Bard & Kurlantzick, supra note 3, at 177, 181-83.
136 Royalty fees collected under the program would have been distributed not only
to those who perform on the record, but to the record companies which produce it as
well. S. 1111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 33(c) (1975), reprinted in Hearings on S. 1111,

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[8: 678

will assist culturally valuable, but commercially ailing, sectors of the
entertainment industry.
The first of these justifications is well based in decisional law. It
has long been a fundamental concept of intellectual property jurisprudence that one may not secure commercial advantage by usurping
another's product, that is, one may not "appropriat[e] to [oneself] the
harvest of those who have sown." 137 It follows that record producers
who are compensated under the present scheme of copyright royalty
payments should not be allowed to collect monies realized, to a significant extent, 138 through the creative labor of performers who may
be paid flat fees1 39 for their work, irrespective of its later achievesupra note 9, at 3-4. Although the bill would have apportioned royalties equally between the two groups designated as recipients, doubt remained as to whether such an
arrangement was administratively workable. S. 1111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 33(c) (1975),
reprinted in Hearings on S. 1111, supra; see Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 12
(Register of Copyrights "had some question" on the sufficiency of proposed compulsory
license system, but was satisfied "it had the ... framework and safeguards necessary for
... practical operation"). For a fuller discussion of the program's feasibility, see notes
151-68 infra and accompanying text.
137 International News Serv. v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918).
For a fuller discussion of the misappropriation theory, see note 64 supra.
138 One early Senate study cites the performer's contribution to record production as
being as essential as those of the composer and the recording engineer. See Blaisdell,
supra note 96, at 103. See also, STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, supra note 121, at 7 ("popularity of an artist can vitally influence

the commercial success of a record"); Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 49 (statement of Stanley M. Gortikov, president, Recording Industry Association of America,
Inc.) (in the case of popular music, "it is often the artist's performance as much as--or
more than-the composer's tune that makes the recording attractive to both record
buyers and radio audiences"); Baudouin, Radio Broadcasting and Authors, Bulletin de
la Societe de legislation compar6e 370 (M. Speiser trans. 1928) ("True music is not that
which is written, it is the tones that the performer makes heard").
Perhaps the most memorable demonstration of just how much a performer's interpretation can affect the reception of a song occurred during hearings on copyright
revision in 1967. During those proceedings, singer Julie London underscored her testimony on the importance of a performer's rendition by singing the Mickey Mouse Club
anthem in a ribald style. See Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at 818-19. Her performance has remained fixed in the minds of commentators on the royalty program. See
Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 71; Brennan, supra note 9, at 205; Lang, supra
note 4, at 70.
139 It was not uncommon, during the recording industry's growing years, for performers to receive but a single payment for their services rendered at the master recording session. Waxman, supra note 3, at 77 n.151. Generally, the practice today is for an
artist to receive a set payment under contract, with provisions included for private royalties if the performer's recording becomes a "hit." Blaisdell, supra note 96, at 98. An
artist's ability to negotiate such private royalty arrangements will usually depend on
whether that artist has a proven sales record. See id.; Bard & Kurlantzick, supra note 3,
at 205. Not only are such plans "by far the exception," but they benefit recording stars
who are already financially well-off. Blaisdell, supra, at 98; Lang, supra note 4, at 71
n.5.
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ment as a sound recording. These fee arrangements have resulted in
great and unjustifiable disparities between the success of a recorded
performance and the amount of consideration received by the artist
for it. 1 4 0 Statutory royalty payments would at least mitigate this harsh
result insofar as fees would be accumulated on each broadcast of a
record regardless of its sales volume. 141 Even if a particular recording
was to become a popular hit, the greater amount of royalties collected
as a result of increased airplay would not, as some opponents have
argued, x42 benefit the featured "star" any more than the anonymous
singers and musicians whose efforts are also captured on the release. 14 3 Instead, each performer would share equally in the royalty
fees generated by his or her particular recording.144
This equitable distribution of performance royalty benefits is an
important point to note in countering one of the arguments consistently put forth by the program's opponents. Briefly, the argument is
this: Even if a public performance right in sound recordings is legally
justifiable, what need do high-income superstars have of these supplemental payments? 145 The answer to the immediate question is, of
In addition, it has been reported that these private programs are often of marginal
worth. See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 50 (statement of Stanley M. Gortikov,
president, Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.) ("[o]nly 188 or so of [one
recording company's] 1,300 performers had a profit in their royalty account").
140 See, for example, the remarks of Senator Alan Cranston during debate on an
amendment to strike the performance royalty clause from S. 1361:
How many of us know who Jimmy Boyd is?
Jimmy is the singer in one of the most phenomenally popular recordings
ever made, "All I Want for Christmas Is My Two Front Teeth." This song is
played many times on virtually every radio station in the country at Christmas.
Yet, sales of the record are not high. Without question, Jimmy's unique rendition of this song has given it the great popularity it presently enjoys. But performances of his rendition are not compensated.
120 CONG. REC. 30,481 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974).
141 See S. 1111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(f)(1), (2) (1975), reprinted in Hearings on S.
1111, supra note 9, at 1-2.
142 See note 133 supra.
143 Although the language of the proposed statutes mandated equal division of royalties between performers and holders of copyright titles to the sound recording, it did
not direct how the performers' half share was to be further subdivided among all those
persons appearing on any one record. See, e.g., S. 1111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 33(c) (1975),
reprinted in Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 3. In light of this situation, an agreement was reached between the performers' unions that this subdivision of royalties
would be on a per capita basis. See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 20. Thus, as
one union spokesman explained, "if on a Frank Sinatra record there are 10 musicians
and 5 background singers, the royalty would be split equally among the 16 people." Id.
144

See id.

See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 29. See also Hearings on S. 597, supra
note 9, at 543.
145
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course, that successful artists such as Barbra Streisand, Arthur Fiedler, Elton John or Miles Davis have no realistic need of such statutory benefits. But the immediate question is itself misleading insofar
as it is framed wholly in terms of performers who are already well
known. It completely ignores the fact that the majority of musical
artists in this country are neither wealthy nor famous,' 46 and would
benefit significantly from receipt of royalty fees. Case histories of
background performers whose efforts have been widely broadcast, but
who have never received a comparable financial return, have been
documented during congressional hearings. 147 Noted among this
group have been a Nashville musician who has played on over 100 hit
records,148 a 23-year member of the New York Philharmonic, 14 9 a
Los Angeles studio singer who has recorded with Andy Williams, 150
and a performer who indicated that his work "is very big in supermarkets and elevators,'151 but who receives nothing for these replays.
These, indeed, are the persons whose experiences demonstrate more
than a bare legal justification for a royalty program.
In addition, creation of this new royalty would not prejudice the
statutory rights of composers and publishers already receiving compulsory license fees. The graduated payments based on each radio
station's advertising revenue 152 would be aggregated totally apart
from the funds collected for distribution to composers and publishers, 15 3 who, in turn, have been granted an increase in the rate at
which their particular royalties are to be determined. 154 It would also
appear that the broadcasting industry's anticipated growth will more
than offset the additional fees levied on it due to such a performance
146

See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 29; Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9,

pt. 2, 47at 542-43.
1 See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 20-21.
148
Id. at 21.
149id.

:5 0 1d.
51Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at 542-43.
152 See note 118 supra.
153See, e.g., S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 114 (1976); S. 1111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 2, 33 (1975), reprinted in Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 1-3; S. 1361, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 114, 116 (1974).
1
154 17 U.S.C.A. §
15(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). The Revision Bill provides for a
modest increase in the statutory rate, from two cents for each recording to the greater of
two and three-quarter cents per recording, or one-half cent per minute of playing time.
Id. § 115(c). Thus, a record which is seven minutes long will earn three and one-half
cents per copy for its composer and publisher, as opposed to two cents under the old
statute. See Copyright Office, Circular R99: Highlights of the New Copyright Law
(Gov't Printing Office 1976); ASCAP, Questions and Answers On The New Copyright
Law (1976).
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royalty. 155 It has been estimated that record company sales to distributors and retailers have been increasing at an average annual rate
of $57 million since 1950.156 Such public demand has prompted
broadcasters to devote some 75 percent of available airtime toward
the playing of sound recordings, which programming generates approximately $900 million per year in advertising revenues nationwide. 157 With the performance royalty program expected to take in
approximately $11 million in its first year of operation, 158 broadcasting's gross income from advertising would still amount to over $875
million with good prospects for future growth.
While discussion about the impact of a performance royalty program on the broadcasting industry has been couched mainly in defensive terms, another argument is that such a program would be of
affirmative benefit, not only to performers, but to sectors of the
broadcasting trade itself which remain commercially unsound despite
their cultural merit. Attention in this respect has primarily been
15 9
given to the plight of classical radio stations and record houses.
Although the financial strength of the entertainment trade has increased in absolute terms, 16 0 this subdivision of the industry continues to operate on a marginal economic basis. 16 1 For example,
exhibits accompanying a recent report to the Senate Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights show that some 95 percent of
all classical albums released in 1972 failed to recoup the cost of their
production through sales. 1 62 More than 99 percent of tape cartridges
63
carrying classical music also failed to pay for themselves that year.1
Because of these extraordinarily low yields on the production of clasSee notes 156-58 and accompanying text infra.
See Recording Industry Association of America's composite estimate of yearly
record sales, cited in Bard & Kurlantzick, supra note 3, at 178 n.87. See also Pop Records: Moguls, Money & Monsters, TIME, Feb. 12, 1973, at 60-61.
157 Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 45, 56, 59.
155

156

158 See note 108 supra,

159See, e.g., Classical-Record Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 10, 1970, at 78; Crisis in
American Classical Music Recording, STEREO REVIEW, Feb. 1971, at 56-80. See also
Weintraub, On The "Economic Dilemma" Within The Performing Arts, 6 PERFORMING
ARTS REV. 21 (1975).

160 See note 1 supra. Much of this economic health has been attributed to the recent
trend among entertainment-oriented companies to either merge with one another or diversify into other areas such as banking, insurance and real estate. Wright, Hollywood's
Happy Ending: A Profitable Twist, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1973, sec. III, at 3, cols. 7 & 8;
Heinsheimer, Music from the Conglomerates, SATURDAY REVIEW, Feb. 22, 1969, at
61-63; see BILLBOARD, Mar. 1, 1969, at 1, cols. 3 & 5.
161 See sources cited in note 159 supra.
162 Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 52.
163 Id. at 53.
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sical works, many record companies have argued that they are forced
to concentrate on turning out more records in the youth-oriented
"rock" genre out of sheer economic necessity. 4 In addition, because
there are fewer chances for young classical performers to be "picked
up" by reputable record houses, it is contended that they have been
165
turning to better recognized endeavors.
Implementation of a performance royalty program would apparently provide incentives for the production of classical artists, as
well as of lesser known popular performers. l6 6 The royalty fees collected from broadcasters, and distributed to both performers and
record producers,' 67 would "soften the risk" of developing sound "recordings . . . for which the [commercial] sales outlook [was] uncertain"1 6 8-- a result certainly in furtherance of "promot[ing] the .. .useful Arts."' 1 9 Thus, even though recordings of "serious" music might
not sell enough records to otherwise merit further production of such
works, royalties collected from continuing airplay would at least potentially provide a source of revenue to offset low sales returns.1 70 In
the domain of classical music, where record producers must almost
wholly rely on record sales to recoup their investment' 7' even though
such record sales are consistently low, 172 the benefit of a performance
royalty is obvious.
Mechanics Of The Program
It is apparent, however, that a major problem remains, not in
73
justifying the performance royalty program, but in administering it. 1
164 See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 54; Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at
457-58, 499, 503-04, 517, 542; Bard & Kurlantzick, supra note 3, at 183 & n.96.
165 See Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at 542.
166 See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 50.
167 See note 136 supra.
168 Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 54.
8.
169 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
170 This type of situation, i.e., where a recording is not bought by the public but yet

receives substantial exposure on radio, is one which recurs in the field of classical music. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 6, 54; Hearings on S. 597, supra note

9, at 504, 542.
171
172

See Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at 504, 542.
See text accompanying note 162 supra.

173 Although an ardent supporter of the performance royalty in principle, the Register of Copyrights has questioned the feasibility of administering such programs as they
were proposed in earlier legislation. See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 12
(statement of Hon. Barbara Ringer). She suggested procedural alternatives including: (a)
having Congress approve the concept of a performance royalty without adopting a
specific plan for its application until a later time; (b) voting the entire program into law,
but only for a trial period, and (c) voting the entire program into law, but having all
royalties collected thereunder paid to the National Endowment for the Arts until a de-
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With regard to classical music, while it is clear that the program
would provide relief to classical record producers, it also would,
without modification, tax the strained financial resources of radio stations which feature such works. 174 Thus, although stimulating the
production of classical records, the proposed program might very well
result in closing down those radio stations over which such records
are played. If the number of outlets for classical broadcasting is reduced, classical works will inevitably receive less airtime, in turn
causing fewer royalties to be collected by those record houses the
175
royalty program was supposed to have helped.
On a broader scale, the problem involves setting up a national
system that will effectively monitor all broadcasts of a sound recording so that the appropriate royalty fee may be determined, collected
and distributed. Although two of the suggestions already put forth by
the Register of Copyrights would require further delay in implementing the program, 176 little time should be needed to construct a system patterned after one or more of those models currently operating
in Europe.
As was noted earlier, over 37 other countries recognize some
form of public performance right in sound recordings. 1 77 Protection is
afforded not only by subscription to international conventions, 7 8 but
through internal legislation.' 79 The most often-cited example of a suctailed scheme "for distributing license fees" could be drafted. Id. at 13. The performers'
unions had already agreed among themselves to pay all persons featured on a recording
according to a per capita basis. See note 128 supra.
174 See, e.g., Bard & Kurlantzick, supra note 3, at 189 & n.112.
175 See id. at 188-91. It would seem that a resolution to this problem lies not in
abandoning the substance of the royalty program, but in adjusting its administration. For
example, provision may be made whereby a set proportion of all royalties collected are
turned over to the National Endowment for the Arts. At each year's end, classical radio
stations showing marginal economic status could apply for a rebate of the amount they
paid out in royalty fees. Other alternatives include: (1) total exemption of classical radio
stations from the royalty program; (2) having classical stations pay the graduated fees
based on net advertising revenues only. Thus, royalty payments would be required in
the same amounts as stipulated for other stations, but only where the particular financial
picture was healthy.
176 See note 173 supra.
177 See note 106 supra. See also Schulman, International Copyright in the United
States: A Critical Analysis, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1954).
178 See, e.g., Berne Copyright Union A-1 Berne Convention, Additional art. and
Final Protocol, art. XVII (1886), reprinted in UNESCO COPYRIGHT LAWS & TREATIES
OF THE WORLD; Berne Copyright Union E-1 Rome Convention (1928), reprinted in
UNESCO COPYRIGHT LAW & TREATIES OF THE WORLD; Universal Copyright Con-

vention, art. XVII and Appendix Declaration, Sept. 6, 1952, [1954] 6 U.S.T. 2731,
T.I.A.S. No. 3324.
179 See Hearingson S. 1111, supra note 9, at 5, 60.
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cessful performance royalty program has been the Danish Gramex
system.'i 0 Essentially, Danish performing arts groups devised a
schedule according to which "points" are assigned to each new recording as it is released.18 1 It was agreed that different types of recordings would receive varying amounts of points depending on factors, such as popularity of the artist and genre of the music, by which
the potential economic success of a record may be gauged. 182 These
point designations are multiplied against the proportionate share of
royalties due each performer under Danish copyright law.1 8 3 The
statistics on each record are then fed into a central computer which
also stores information, provided by the country's nationalized radio,
as to how much airplay each release receives.18 4 At the end of every
year the computer tabulates all this information and automatically
processes individual checks for distribution. 18 5 A similar system has
been implemented in Sweden, 1 6 and would seem adaptable to the
American proposal.
Despite the absence of a nationalized radio system here, the
existing structures of performing rights organizations such as ASCAP
and BMI would lend themselves to feasible administration of a national royalty program. These groups already have established procedures by which each broadcast of a sound recording is logged and
statutory royalties based on airplay are computed. 8 7 Should there be
180E.g., Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at 508-09; Waxman, supra note 3, at
72-73; Comment, 59 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 17, at 574 n.169.
181Waxman, supra note 3, at 72.
182See id. See also Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at 509.
183Waxman, supra note 3, at 72 & n.134. As under the proposed American program,

performance royalties accrue to the performers on a recording each time it is broadcast.
See Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at 509; Waxman, supra at 72 n.134.
184Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at 509.
185

Id.

186See Stewart, Royalties for Record Play on the Radio, 13 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y

61, 65-66 (1965).
187 See note 52 supra;

1 W. HURST & W. HALE, THE RECORD INDUSTRY BOOK 3

(1961).
At present, each radio station wishing to play the works of composers who have
assigned their performance rights to either ASCAP or BMI is required to keep, and
regularly submit, a log showing what records were broadcast over the preceding period,
as well as how many times each record was played. See B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, supra
note 4, at 503-05.
In order to cut down on the amount of paperwork that would be involved in tabulating similar information with respect to performers' royalties, it has been suggested "that
an inaudible identification signal . . . be incorporated in all future recordings. This
signal, although not noticeable to the listener when the recording is performed, will be
intelligible to [the administering authority's] electronic equipment." Hearings on S. 597,
supra note 9, at 507. Preliminary work on such a system has already been undertaken.
Id.
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a legitimate question whether these existing organizations may legally
administer the royalty program, 18 8 an independent, nonprofit licens1 89
ing organization could be created to operate in a similar manner.
Proponents of the measure have already offered to cooperate with
broadcasting representatives in working out a licensing system compatible to the interests of both groups.1 90
Conclusion
Thus it can be seen that congressional recognition of a public
performance royalty in sound recordings, mandated by copyright policy, as well as by the modern trend of statutory and case law, remains
warranted despite the repeated efforts of private interests to defeat
such a proposal. Although the vicissitudes of the political climate in
which the royalty program's fate will be determined may again
swing' 91 in opposition to this long overdue legislative reform, it is
clear that statutory favor for performers is both permissible and deserved.
Allen Edward Molnar
188 In

the past,

governmental

authorities

have

addressed

the

consolidation

of

economic power within performing rights societies and the news media by invalidating
certain arrangements as violative of federal antitrust policy. See B. KAPLAN & R.
BROWN, supra note 4, at 505-12; Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising

Modern Music: The ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 294
(1954). See also Court Bars Papers From Owning Radio or T.V. in Same City, N.Y.
Times, March 2, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
189Such a body has been contemplated by recording industry spokesmen. See Hearings on S. 597, supra note 9, at 506-07.
190 See Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 37 (remarks of Stanley M. Gortikov,
president, Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.).
191Indeed, the primary sponsor of the bill in Congress, Sen. Hugh Scott, did not
seek reelection in November, 1976. In addition, the Republican administration of President Gerald Ford, which supported the performance royalty measure, has also been
replaced. See generally Hearings on S. 1111, supra note 9, at 13, 19.

